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Abstract 
The Split Share Structure Reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their 
restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more related to share price movements. 
We predict this reform will create remuneration arrangements that increase the relationship between 
Chinese firms’ executive pay and stock market performance. We confirm this prediction by showing 
such effect among state-controlled firms and especially those where dominant shareholders have 
greater incentives to improve share return performance. Our results indicate this reform strengthens 
the accountability of executives to external monitoring by stock market and therefore benefit minority 
shareholders in China.  
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1. Introduction 
 The Split Share Structure Reform, which began in 2005, is hailed as one of the most significant 
capital market and corporate ownership reform in China (Chen et al., 2012). We examine the impact 
of this reform on the relationship between executive remuneration and stock return performance of 
Chinese listed firms. This reform requires all restricted shares held by state shareholders to be 
converted into tradable shares equivalent to those held by private shareholders. 1
Therefore, this reform should align the wealth implications of share price movement on both state and 
private shareholders.2 We expect the impact of this reform to be more pronounced among Chinese 
firms controlled by state ownership, since it enhances the incentives of the dominant shareholders to 
monitor and ensure that executives maximize firm value. Our study contributes to two strands of 
literature. For the growing literature on Chinese capital market, we provide original evidence on 
whether this major regulatory intervention benefited the minority shareholders by increasing 
managerial accountability to the stock market. For the ownership structure literature, we apply a 
unique setting of an exogenously induced reduction in the conflict of interests between dominant and 
minority shareholders to evaluate the effect of such a conflict on agency costs.  
Previous literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002) suggests two counteracting 
effects of ownership concentration on corporate governance. First, large shareholders can cause an 
entrenchment effect (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Djankov et al., 2008), 
which is similar to the situation when managerial ownership increases beyond an optimal point (e.g., 
Stulz, 1988; Morck et al., 1998; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). As a result of their dominance in 
control, such shareholders can affect the management to pursue their own benefit, and are less subject 
to stock market discipline of outside investors. Second, large shareholders can also be associated with 
an incentive alignment effect (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gomes, 2000) if their interest and 
wealth are associated with the value of the firm they control. Due to this alignment, such shareholders 
are discouraged from expropriating their firm, which may reduce their share value in the stock 
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market. In our setting, state shareholders of Chinese state-controlled listed firms are more linked to 
the entrenchment effect prior to the Split Share Structure Reform since the restricted share they hold 
deprives them of wealth gains from higher firm value in the market. We argue that the opportunity to 
trade their shares and cash in from rising stock price of their firm enabled by this reform tilts the state 
shareholders of Chinese state-controlled listed firms toward the incentive alignment effect.  
 The state control of Chinese listed firms has often been blamed for impeding corporate 
governance reforms and performance, against the interests of outside investors (e.g., Fan et al., 2007). 
This control is characterized by two main features. First, executives are appointed and/or influenced 
by the state. As a result, the typical agency problems (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976) are considered 
to be more pronounced in state controlled firms. This is because their executives are more insulated 
from effective supervision by the capital market, and they have greater incentives to extract benefits 
and/or withhold value relevant information from outside investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Second, state ownership is mainly of restricted shares that are not tradable in the stock market, unlike 
their unrestricted and tradable counterparts, which are held largely by private shareholders. This is 
known as the split share structure (see Section 2.2 for further discussion of the institutional 
background), and it causes stock price movements to affect the wealth of minority shareholders but 
not that of dominating shareholders. Instead, the state controlling shareholders gain either political 
credit, by ensuring that executives carry out government initiatives, or dividends, if the firm makes 
reasonable profits. This is the source of the conflicts of interest between the dominant and minority 
shareholders in Chinese state controlled listed firms. Since the wealth of controlling state 
shareholders is insulated against changes in the share price, they are less motivated than minority 
shareholders to ensure that the executives maximize firms’ market value. Empirical studies have 
documented the adverse impact of state control and ownership in Chinese listed firms on share price 
informativeness (Gul et al., 2010), CEO turnover to performance sensitivity (Conyon and He, 2008), 
and CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Firth et al., 2006; 2007). 
 The state ownership of listed firms stems from the intention to maintain governmental influence, 
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as a result of China’s political ideology and transitional economy. However, aware of the ailments 
resulting from state ownership, China has allowed firm-specific voluntary ownership transfers, by 
which state ownership can be transferred to private entities at firms’ choice (Hou and Howell, 2012). 
In theory, increased private ownership should strengthen outside investor monitoring and increase 
firm executives’ accountability to the capital market (e.g., Boycko et al., 1996; Denis and McConnell, 
2003). For instance, Chen et al. (2008) show improved operating performance in Chinese firms that 
voluntarily switch from state to private controlling shareholders. However, China still has weaker 
legal enforcement and shareholder protection than developed countries. In such an institutional 
environment, increasing private ownership alone may not necessarily be enough to strengthen 
managerial incentives to maximize shareholder wealth (e.g., Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Given the 
dilemma surrounding the need to strengthen corporate governance, and the reluctance to relinquish 
government control entirely, abolishing the split share structure between state and private ownership 
becomes an obvious solution. Aligning the incentives of dominant and minority shareholders may 
strengthen corporate governance and reduce agency costs among state controlled Chinese listed 
firms. Starting from 2005, China piloted the Split Share Structure Reform first on a small batch of 
listed firms and subsequently expanded it to all listed firms, which were required to terminate the 
trading constraints imposed on their restricted shares, to enable these shares to become tradable.3 
Following a previously failed attempt, the Chinese capital market authority was now determined to 
make this round of reform successful. For instance, Firth et al. (2010) show that state controlled firms 
pay higher consideration for the release of restricted shares to the stock market to compensate 
existing tradable shareholders relative to private shareholder-controlled firms, and they interpret this 
as evidence of pressure being exerted by the Chinese capital market authority.   
 Although the holdings of dominant shareholders in state-controlled firms may remain 
unchanged, the values of all shares are now subject to price movements in the capital market. In other 
words, both the state and private shareholders now benefit when executives increase firms’ market 
value. Thus, the incentives of both groups of shareholders are now more aligned to ensure that 
 5 
executives improve firm’s share return performance. An effective way of achieving this is through 
executives’ remuneration arrangement, i.e. to increase the relationship between executive pay and 
share return performance. As a result, we predict that executive remuneration in state-controlled 
Chinese listed firms will become more associated with stock returns after the reform. Empirical 
evidence in favor of this prediction implies that the reform has benefitted the Chinese capital market, 
by strengthening the controlling shareholders’ incentives to hold executives more accountable to the 
objective of firm value maximization. To confirm our prediction, we compare the relationship 
between executive pay to share return performance before and after the reform was finalized. We 
expect state shareholders’ incentive to increase their firms’ market value to be triggered once this 
reform is imminent and the process commences by end of 2005. This assumption is reasonable and 
intuitive since increasing share price even before trading restriction is fully eliminated would allow 
state shareholders to cash in more should they decide to sell the moment their shares turn tradable. 
With state shareholders interested in share return performance of their firms, minority private 
shareholders of Chinese state-controlled listed firms gets greater assurance that the dominant 
shareholders will strengthen their supervision of managers to promote share value maximization.  
 We assume that the alignment of interest between controlling and minority shareholders brought 
about by the reform is likely to make a greater difference among state-controlled than 
privately-controlled Chinese listed firms. Therefore, we classify the state-controlled firms as the 
treatment group (where we expect to observe empirical evidence in support of our hypotheses) and 
privately-controlled firms as the control group (where we expect not to observe empirical evidence in 
support of our hypotheses) in our analyses. To be able to infer that the reform exerts the impact we 
predict, we need to observe, following the reform, significantly more pronounced increases in the 
relationship between executive pay and share return performance in the treatment group than in the 
control groups. Otherwise, either there has been no change in this relationship, or the change is not 
brought about by the reform, but by some unidentified confounding effect. Our study covers the 
sample period 2000-2007. We define years 2000 to 2005 as the period before (henceforth pre-reform) 
 6 
and years 2006 to 2007 as the period after (henceforth post-reform) the Split Share Structure Reform 
was implemented. Although firms were selected in batches to carry out the reform, there was no 
uncertainty as all listed firms were involved in the reform. We therefore expect the incentive 
alignment between dominant and minority shareholders in state-controlled firms to begin once the 
implementation of the reform was formally announced, i.e. end of 2005.  
 Our findings are as follows. Among the state-controlled firms, we observe that executive 
remuneration is significantly and positively related with operating performance but not with share 
return performance during the pre-reform period. This is broadly consistent with the findings of Firth 
et al. (2006; 2007) although both studies are based on earlier sample period (1998-2000). During the 
post-reform period, we observe among such firms a significant increase in the relationship of 
executive pay and share return performance. In contrast, no such increase is observed for the 
association between executive pay to operating performance. This finding confirms our prediction 
that the incentive alignment between dominant and minority shareholders prompts the former to 
strengthen the link between executive remuneration and market value of the state-controlled Chinese 
listed firms, i.e. our treatment group. Among the privately-controlled firms, during the pre-reform 
period we observe that executive remuneration is significantly and positively related with share return 
performance but not operating performance (i.e. the opposite of state-controlled firms). This is again 
broadly consistent with Firth et al. (2006; 2007) despite the difference in sample period. During the 
post-reform period, we observe among such firms no incremental effect in executive remuneration’s 
relation with either share return or operating performance. The observation of no reform effect in the 
control group strengthens our inference that the increase in relationship between executive 
remuneration to share returns performance in our treatment group is indeed due to the incentive 
alignment effect between dominant and minority shareholders in the post-reform period.  
 Further analyses within our treatment group reveal that the increase in relationship between 
executive pay and share return performance after the reform is more pronounced among 
state-controlled firms where dominant shareholder have greater incentives to improve share return 
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performance. These include firms that are not affiliated with the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) and firms that payout more restricted shares as part of the 
reform consideration. The SASAC is a Chinese central government bureaucratic agency, which is 
expected to maintain ownership and control of listed firms of vital importance to national interest 
(e.g. energy and aerospace/defense sectors). Thus, we expected SASAC affiliated shareholders to be 
less likely to sell their holdings and cash in on the rise in share value compared to their non-SASAC 
affiliated counterparts. As part of the reform process, firms must negotiate and agree with existing 
holders of unrestricted shares on a consideration scheme. This involves the payout of restricted shares 
as part of the consideration. Firms that payout more restricted shares bear higher cost to participate in 
the reform. Thus, we expect dominant shareholders of such firms to have greater incentives to 
improve their firms’ market value after the reform by adjusting the executive remuneration scheme, 
so as to recuperate the cost of the consideration payout. The observation of greater effect among these 
state-controlled firms (i.e. non-SASAC affiliated or higher restricted share payout) with greater 
incentives to improve share return performance further strengthens our inference that the increased 
relationship between executive remuneration and share return we observe is indeed due to the reform. 
All aforementioned results are robust to controls of firm size, leverage, growth, loss, ownership 
concentration, board size, board activeness, board independence, managerial ownership, CEO 
duality, as well as both regional and industry effects. Therefore, we find empirical evidence in support 
of our prediction that the Split Share Structure Reform improves the accountability of executives to 
their market performance among state-controlled listed firms in China. 
 Our findings contribute to two key strands of the academic literature. For the literature on 
economic development in China, we show that the Split Share Structure Reform has a positive impact 
on the capital market. As far as our results show, it strengthens corporate governance and benefit 
minority private investors of state-controlled firms. Thus, our findings have implications for 
investors, academics, and regulators interested in capital market development in China, which is 
currently one of the largest transitional economies, with increasing influence both regionally and 
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globally.4 For the literature on ownership structure, our findings have the following implications. 
First, we show that the incentive alignment between different classes of shareholders can improve 
corporate governance, as manifested in our case by better executive remuneration practices. This 
result highlights that, even in economies where radical changes to firms’ ownership structure (such as 
privatization) are expensive for economic, social, and political reasons, there are still ways of 
improving corporate governance. Our results also imply that the full privatization of Chinese listed 
firms is not necessary to improve governance and performance. Second, we amply illustrate that an 
external influence, in the form of regulatory intervention, can strengthen corporate governance. This 
is particularly beneficial in a transitional economy with relatively weak legal protection and 
information disclosure, as in China. 
 Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, explains the institutional 
background, and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sample and methodologies. 
Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Ownership and executive compensation in China 
 The relationship between corporate ownership structure and executive compensation is well 
established in the corporate governance literature on western developed economies. Ownership 
structure plays a crucial role in corporate governance, which deals with the agency problem induced 
by the separation of ownership and control (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Large shareholders are 
assumed to have more incentives, and to be more effective in monitoring executives, and so have 
greater potential to reduce the agency problem (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Admati et al., 1994; 
Maug, 1998; Noe, 2002). Holderness and Sheeban (1988) find positive market reaction intended to 
block trades that would create a dominant shareholder. Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and 
Shivdasani (1995) document that the presence of large shareholders is associated with increased 
management turnover. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find evidence that large shareholders exert 
tighter control over executive compensation. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional 
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ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-performance sensitivity of executive 
compensation, and negatively related to the level of compensation. 
 Starting in the early 1990s, many state owned firms in China were partially privatized, and 
shares from these firms are traded on the stock exchanges. However, the state (including central and 
local government) often retains sufficient shares (through both state and legal person shares) to 
maintain control of these listed firms; this distinguishes China from other transitional economies, 
where the state relinquishes all of its ownership (e.g., Russia). The majority of firms currently listed 
on the Chinese stock exchanges remain dominated by state ownership. However, despite the growth 
potential of the Chinese economy and high share prices, the profitability of many Chinese listed firms 
is limited (e.g., Leung et al., 2002; Allen et al., 2005). Chen et al. (2008) show that firms that 
voluntarily switch from state to private ownership dominance are associated with improved 
performance. Gul et al. (2010) report that the low stock price informativeness of listed firms in China 
relative to other countries, as documented by Morck et al. (2000), is more pronounced among 
state-controlled firms. 
 The existing corporate governance literature suggests two possible reasons for this. First, since 
the executives of state-controlled listed firms are appointed and influenced by the government, they 
are insulated from the monitoring of outside investors, and are expected to pursue political rather than 
profit-maximizing objectives (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Second, the concentration of state 
ownership in such firms encourages collusion between executives to divert firm resources (e.g., 
Claessens et al., 2002), and/or to extract benefits (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) at the expense of 
outside investors. To conceal such self-serving behavior, state-controlled listed firms in China may 
withhold unfavorable information, and/or manage the release of price sensitive information (e.g., Fan 
and Wong, 2005). Due to the lack of information and the high degree of state ownership 
concentration, outside private investors in Chinese listed firms also have lower incentives to exercise 
their rights to monitor the executives (Tenev et al., 2002). 
 According to The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China, issued by the China 
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Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), controlling shareholders make recommendations on the 
appointment and pay of top executives in Chinese listed firms. Although there is evidence that 
executive compensation in China is linked to some performance targets (Fleisher and Wang, 2003; 
Yueh, 2004; Chang and Wong, 2009; Firth et al, 2010), in Chinese listed firms the corporate 
governance characteristics exert limited influence over executive pay (Cha, 2001; Li et al., 2007; 
Tong et al., 2003). There is also limited use and disclosure of executive stock options, and this is 
perhaps because of higher turnover, and/or Chinese CEOs preference for cash over stock (Firth et al., 
2006). Kato and Long (2006a,b) find that privately controlled Chinese listed firms are associated with 
better subsequent performance following CEO replacement. Conyon and He (2008) find that CEO 
turnover has weaker sensitivity to share price performance for firms controlled by the state. Ke et al. 
(2012) show that no turnover to performance sensitivity among Chinese state-controlled listed firms 
in Hong Kong. Firth et al. (2006; 2007) show that CEO compensation is sensitive to operating 
performance, but not to share price performance, among state-controlled Chinese listed firms. They 
also emphasize that these sensitivities are low, and unlikely to provide executives with incentives to 
increase profit and firm values. Cao et al. (2011) also that pay-performance in state-controlled firms 
are more related to accounting performance and that of non-state firms are more related to 
market-based performance. These empirical findings generally imply that executives in Chinese 
listed firms controlled by state ownership are not contracted to maximize shareholder wealth.  
2.2 Split Share Structure Reform in China 
 The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were established in the early 1990s and currently 
list well over 1,500 firms. The shares of Chinese listed firms can be classified into four types. The A 
shares (denominated in RMB) originally could be traded only by domestic investors, but are now also 
open to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII). The B shares (denominated in US$) at first 
could be traded only by foreign investors, but are now also open to domestic investors. The H shares 
(denominated in US$ and HK$) are listed in the Hong Kong stock exchange. Finally, there are shares 
of companies that are cross-listed abroad, i.e., in the New York (NYSE) and London (LSE) stock 
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exchanges. The A shares are further classified into restricted and freely-traded shares, i.e., a split 
share structure. There are two kinds of restricted shares, i.e., state or legal-person. The former is held 
by central and local government through their bureaucratic agencies or affiliated SOEs. The latter can 
be held by any of the above or private entities. Such shares are not freely tradable in the stock 
exchanges and can only be transferred privately, usually at a discounted value relative to the firm’s 
freely tradable shares, which are largely held by outside private investors. 
 The split share structure stems from the socio-political ideology in China. On the one hand, the 
government still wishes to retain influence in firms, in order to achieve political and social objectives. 
On the other hand, the government also wants Chinese firms to transform into modern enterprises that 
are capable of raising their own capital, thus reducing state subsidies. However, studies by Sun and 
Tong (2003) and Wei et al. (2005) suggest that partial privatization and the split share structure reduce 
firms’ corporate governance quality and performance efficiency. The restricted shares of controlling 
state shareholders can change hands through two channels. First, they can be transferred with the 
authorities’ approval, in which case the transfer price is often set near the book value (e.g., Xu, 2003). 
Second, they can be auctioned, but with a substantial illiquidity discount in their value, due to the lack 
of tradability. For instance, Chen and Xiong (2001) document a 77.93% discount and Huang and Xu 
(2009) document a discount of over 70%. Firth et al. (2006) argue that holding restricted shares gives 
less incentive for the controlling state shareholders to monitor executives to ensure that they 
maximize stock value. They find some evidence that state shareholders focus more on accounting 
performance, which facilitates them receiving dividend payouts and/or political credits. However, 
accounting performance can be subject to managerial manipulation (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 
1987), and it does not necessarily ensure shareholder wealth maximization. Although state ownership 
can be sold to outside private investors, which would result in a change in control (e.g., Chen et al., 
2008), this has been done only on a voluntary basis, and the shares transferred remained restricted and 
untradeable. 
 Following a previously unsuccessful attempt, in 2001, to reform the split share structure, the 
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CSRC announced, on 29th April 2005, its decision to mandate the release of all restricted shares into 
the secondary market. Two batches of firms were selected in May and June 2005 for initial piloting. 
By August and September 2005 two official documents providing formal operational procedures 
were issued. To avoid a sharp price decline in the stock market, as occurred in previous such attempts 
(Kim et al., 2003), negotiations with existing tradable shareholders were required to decide a 
satisfactory level of consideration payout. Cumming and Hou (2012) show that the consideration is 
not systematically underpaid and the reform is fair at the market level. Firth et al. (2010) provide 
evidence that state-controlled listed firms pay more considerations to existing tradable shareholders, 
perhaps due to government pressure to ensure the success of this reform. Listed firms are selected in 
batches by the authorities to carry out this process. Once the negotiation process terminates and the 
consideration deal is agreed, the portion of the restricted shares paid out as consideration to the 
minority private investors becomes immediately tradable. After a 12-month period following the 
consideration scheme, all restricted shares held by shareholders possessing less than 5% of the firm’s 
ownership can be traded in the stock market. Within a further 12 and 24 months after this, larger 
shareholders possessing over 5% of the firm’s ownership can trade up to 5% and 10% respectively of 
their restricted shares. Finally, all restricted shares become completely tradable in the stock market 
36-months horizon after the implementation of consideration plan. Chinese listed firms have 
completed their consideration scheme ratifications by the end of 2008 to enact the gradual release of 
their restricted shares. Most of Chinese listed firms will no longer have restricted shares by the end of 
2011.  
The benefits brought by the reform have recently attracted the attention of researchers. 
Empirical studies show that following this reform there is significant reduction in average cash 
holdings (Chen et al, 2012), decrease of foreign share discount (Hou and Lee, 2012), and increase of 
stock informativeness (Hou, et al., 2012) and CEO turnover-fraud sensitivities (Cumming et al., 
2011). These findings are consistent with the reform leading to improved corporate governance, 
possibly through better incentive alignment between controlling shareholders and minority 
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shareholders.  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
 The aforementioned literature highlights two key issues related to our study. First, the ownership 
structure affects the corporation’s governance quality, which in turn determines executive 
compensation. Second, Chinese listed firms are heavily dominated by state ownership, and these state 
owners have had the prior trading restrictions on the shares they held lifted as a result of the reform. 
We intersect these two issues and argue that the Split Share Structure Reform, which seeks to render 
restricted shares tradable, should affect the relationship between executive remuneration and 
shareholder wealth in Chinese state-controlled listed firms. 
 Our rationale is as follows. Prior to the reform, the untradeable restricted shares held by 
controlling state shareholders had low liquidity and value. Transfers of unrestricted shares were 
infrequent and occurred only after approval by the authorities. Even if the transfers took place the 
price of such shares was set substantially lower than that of tradable shares due to their illiquidity 
discount, and was often close to the book value. As a result, controlling state shareholders received no 
wealth gains from rises in the stock market value of the tradable shares. Therefore, they had limited 
incentive to appraise executives using stock price performance, or to monitor them on behalf of 
minority private shareholders in order to maximize the market value of the firm. Following the 
reform, the shares held by the controlling shareholders have become tradable in the stock market. 
Thus, the state owners now receive wealth gains from rises in share prices, as do their minority 
shareholder counterparts. The controlling shareholders therefore have a greater incentive to monitor 
executives, and to ensure that they maximize shareholders’ wealth. A direct and effective way of 
increasing managerial incentives to maximize their firm’s market value is through their remuneration 
scheme. Therefore we hypothesize that: 
H1: The Split Share Structure Reform increases the relationship between executive 
remuneration and share return performance among state-controlled listed firms but not 
privately-controlled listed firms in China. 
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If our empirical evidence in favor of hypothesis H1 is indeed attributable to the reform, then we 
expect the effect to be more pronounced among state-controlled firms where dominant shareholders 
have more incentive to boost share return performance after the reform. We identify such firms in two 
ways. First, we expect state shareholders of firms expected to maintain central government control of 
listed firms that are vital to national interest (e.g. energy and aerospace/defence sector) to be less 
likely to sell their shares even if trading restriction is lifted after the reform. As mentioned earlier, in 
China the SASAC is the central government bureaucratic agency responsible for state control of 
strategically important sector. Since the controlling shareholders of firms under the control of 
SASAC are obliged not to relinquish state shareholding even after the reform, they continue to gain 
little from rising share price and therefore less incentive to adjust executive remuneration scheme to 
pursue this objective. In other words, the influence of the reform in incentivizing controlling 
shareholders to monitor and ensure managers maximize firm’s market value is moderated in SASAC 
controlled firms due to reasons other than the split share structure per se.5 As a result, the efficacy of 
the reform in strengthening corporate governance by increasing the relationship between managerial 
pay and performance is likely to be lower among SASAC state-controlled firms than their 
counterparts not controlled by SASAC. It is possible to rationalize this within the framework of 
agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that agency cost for the principal includes 
expenditures to monitor and incentivize the agent, as well as the residual loss of firm value caused by 
divergence of interest between principal and agent. For state-controlled firms prior to the reform 
under the split share structure and for SASAC controlled firms both before and after the reform, the 
controlling shareholders are exposed to less residual loss of firm value from the dimension of their 
firms stock market performance. When the principal is exposed to less residual loss of firm value, 
they are less willing to bear the cost to monitor and incentivize the agent. The Split Share Structure 
Reform increases the exposure of controlling state shareholders to residual loss of firm value 
associate with stock return performance only for non-SASAC state-controlled firms but not for their 
SASAC controlled counterparts. Thus, within our treatment group we further identify these two 
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groups of state-controlled firms and we hypothesize that: 
H2: The increase in the relationship between executive remuneration and share return 
performance among state-controlled listed firms in China following the Split Share Structure 
Reform is concentrated among those not controlled by SASAC. 
Second, we expect state-controlled firms that payout more restricted shares as part of the reform 
consideration to existing holders of unrestricted shares to have more incentives to improve share 
return performance after the reform. This is because such firms are paying higher cost to participate in 
this reform, which implies that the dominating state shareholders place a higher value on the 
tradability of their shares after the reform and are also more motivated to recuperate this cost through 
potential wealth gains from trading their shares. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
H3: The increase in the relationship between executive remuneration and share return 
performance among state-controlled listed firms in China following the Split Share Structure 
Reform is more pronounced for those that payout more restricted shares as reform 
consideration. 
 There are some possible factors that could bias against us finding evidence consistent with our 
aforementioned hypotheses. First, the Chinese stock markets are not efficient enough to warrant using 
stock return performance as a suitable measure to evaluate firm performance. However, studies such 
as Fan and Zhang (1998) and Hu (1998) suggest that the Chinese stock market is weak-form and 
semi-strong-form efficient. Second, the financial crisis has overlapped with our post-reform period, 
and could add substantial noise to our analyses. However, the financial crisis is likely to affect both 
state- and private-dominated Chinese listed firms simultaneously. Third, Chinese convergence 
toward the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) also overlaps with our post-reform 
period. If the financial reporting quality improves, then accounting numbers will become more 
verifiable, and firms may prefer accounting performance over stock-return performance, as a way of 
appraising executives and determining their remuneration.6 Again, this is likely to affect both state- 
and privately-controlled listed firms. Finally, there may be some non-SASAC state-controlled firms 
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where government is also keen to retain control and in such firms the state shareholders may also be 
reluctant to sell their shares after the reform in order to avoid losing control. In such firms, there could 
also be a lack of change in controlling state-shareholders incentives following the reform, just like 
their SASAC counterparts. Since it is difficult and beyond the scope of our study to determine 
government’s choice of firm to retain control, we leave this for further study.7 
For hypothesis H1, there are two possible counterarguments. First, there is no increase in state 
shareholders’ interest in maximizing stock value until all restricted shares of a firm become fully 
tradable, and this will be 36 months after the implementation of the consideration scheme in the 
reform process of each firm. In other words, it would not be possible to study the impact of the reform 
across the complete Chinese stock market based on a pre-2011 sample and our study would not be 
able to capture any changes in state shareholders incentives due to reform. However, this argument is 
hinged on the assumption that state shareholders are myopic and unable to plan ahead after the 
CSRC’s policy announcement in 2005, which already clarified the government’s intention to 
propagate the reform across all firms. State shareholders who are aware of the implication of this 
imminent reform would be keen to step up their pressure on managers to increase the firms’ market 
value before their shares becomes tradable. It is counterintuitive to expect state shareholders to lay 
dormant until the end of the all their shares become tradable and then suddenly wake up to begin this 
effort. As we explain in Section 2.2, state shareholders can already sell all or a portion of their 
holdings within the 36 months horizon, depending on the proportion of their ownership. Therefore, 
this critique also neglects changes in state shareholders incentives due to the wealth implication of 
rising share price over this transitional period.  
Second, the abolishment of trading restrictions is only symbolic because even after the reform 
the state shareholders will be pressured not to sell shares because the government wants to maintain 
ownership and control of listed firms. Since the state shareholders have the rights to sell but would not 
dare to challenge government pressure, there is no change in their interest toward boosting stock 
return performance at all. This critique unfortunately neglects the “Zhua Da Fang Xiao” policy of the 
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Chinese government, which seeks to retain state influence mainly in strategically important 
enterprises (e.g., energy, transportation, aerospace, defense, and etc.) and encourages the relaxation of 
state control of less essential businesses.8 Furthermore, there is also anecdotal evidence from the 
financial media that shows state shareholders have actively traded their previously restricted shares in 
the stock market following this reform.9 State shareholders may not be observed to flock and dump 
all their shares immediately once they are allowed to trade, but this does not imply that the reform did 
not generate any incentives among them to be interested in their firms’ stock market performance. 
Those who held on to their shareholdings could be doing so in anticipation of long-term growth 
prospect of their firms’ market value. 
3. Sample and Methodology 
3.1 Sample description 
 Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. Listed firms are required to disclose executive compensation 
from 1998 onward, but we skip the first two years due to lack of data for a wide cross-section of firms. 
From GTA/CSMAR we obtain our measure of executive compensation, which is the aggregated total 
pay of the top three executives; this measure has been used by existing studies such as Kato and Long 
(2005).10 From CCER (China Center of Economic Research) we obtain firm characteristic variables, 
such as stock returns, operating income, sales, total assets, leverage, special treatment status, board 
size, number of board meetings, proportion of independent directors, managerial ownership, CEO 
duality, regional classification, industrial classification, state control status, and reform consideration. 
Our final sample requires all the aforementioned variables to have valid values, and has 7,695 
observations. Table 1 presents the yearly number of observations and average executive pay. The 
number of Chinese listed firms included in our sample increased from 269 in 2000 to 1213 in 2007. 
This reflects the expansion of the Chinese stock markets. The percentage of listed firms controlled by 
the state declined from 85.87% (231/269) in 2000 to 66.03% (801/1213) in 2007. This reflects the 
gradual increase in the private control of listed firms. On average, over 70% of Chinese listed firms 
are controlled by the state shareholders, i.e., our treatment group. Turning to average top executive 
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pay, we note the increase from RMB 140 thousand in 2000 to RMB 893 thousand in 2007. This six 
fold rise reflects growth in both the economy and in living standards over our sample period.  
[insert Table 1 here] 
3.2 Test of hypothesis 
 To test our predictions in hypotheses H1 to H3 about the impact of the Split Share Structure 
Reform on the relationship between executive compensation level and performance, we apply a 
model specification, as in Equation 1 below: 
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The dependent variable ExecPAYi,t is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives for firm i at 
year t (in thousand RMB).11  SSSRi,t indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform and is 
a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RETi,t captures stock market 
performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROSi,t captures operating performance and is 
measured as operating income divided by sales. Sizei,t is log of total assets of the firm. Levi,t captures 
financial risk and is measured as debt to equity ratio. SGi,t captures growth opportunity and is the 
annual percentage growth of sales. STi,t is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with 
two consecutive years of losses, and 0 otherwise. OwnConi,t is ownership concentration measured by 
the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZEi,t 
is 1 for firms with board size above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Dualityi,t is 1 for firms 
with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeti,t is a dummy set to 1 for firms with 
above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndepi,t is 1 for firms with proportion of 
independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwni,t is set to 1 for firms 
with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. 
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Areai,t is 1 for firms from more developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RIndi,t is 1 
for firms in more regulated industry (natural resources, public utilities, or finance and real estate) and 
0 otherwise. Coefficient α2 indicates whether executive pay is related to share return performance in 
the pre-reform period. If coefficient α3 > 0, this will indicate an increase in this relationship during the 
post-reform period. 12  If we observe this effect in state-controlled listed firms but not their 
privately-controlled counterpart, then we have evidence in support of hypothesis H1. Among 
state-controlled firms, if we observe this effect to be more pronounced in those with higher state 
ownership and consideration payout using restricted shares, then we confirm hypotheses H2 and H3 
respectively. 13 
 The data for the aggregated pay of the top three executives has also been used by previous 
studies, e.g., Kato and Long (2005). Total pay comprises cash salary, bonus, and commissions. As 
discussed by Firth et al. (2006), the individual items cannot be broken down, and options are either 
rarely used or disclosed. In measuring operating performance, we follow Firth et al. (2006) by using 
operating income scaled by sales. Our definition of state control covers both central and local 
government through both state and legal person shares. Our choice of control variables follows the 
executive pay literature, i.e., firm size (e.g., Conyon, 1998), leverage (e.g., Basu et al., 2007; Hernan, 
2007), growth opportunities (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Himmelberg et al., 1999), and board 
characteristics (e.g., Conger et al., 1998). We also control for regional effects, because there are 
substantial disparities in living expenses and wages between the coastal and interior regions of China 
(Firth et al., 2006; 2007). We control for difference between more and less regulated industry 
following Fan et al. (2007). 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation  
 Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. Across our full 
sample (i.e., including both state-controlled and privately-controlled listed firms) and over our 
sample period (i.e., 2000 to 2007), the average aggregate remuneration of the top three executives 
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(ExecPay) is around RMB 568 thousand.14  The average annual stock return (RET) is 34.87%, which 
reflects the rising stock value of listed firms in the Chinese stock markets over this period. The 
average profitability of our sampled firms, measured by operating income divided by sales (ROS), is 
1.0%. The average firm in our sample has debt-to-equity ratio of 48.23% and experiences around 
26.83% annual sales growth. Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in our 
analyses. We note that ExecPay level is significantly positively correlated with both the market and 
operating performance indicators, i.e., RET and ROS. Throughout our sample, firms with higher 
leverage or are loss making pay significantly less to executives. On the other hand, listed firms that 
are larger in size and are based in higher income regions (Shanghai and Shenzhen) tend to pay 
significantly more.  
[insert Table 2 here] 
[insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Test of hypothesis H1 
 Table 4 presents our result from the test of hypothesis H1. Among the state-controlled listed 
firms, the coefficient on ROS is significantly positive but the coefficient on RET is statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that the executive remuneration among such firms is positively related 
with operating performance but not share return performance prior to the Split Share Structure 
Reform. This finding is broadly consistent with Firth et al (2006, 2007) despite of the earlier sample 
period they analyze. Among state-controlled listed firms, the coefficient on the interactive term 
SSSRRET is significantly positive (i.e. 79.04, t-statistics = 3.00) but the coefficient on the interactive 
term SSSRROS is statistically insignificant. This suggests that executive remuneration among such 
firms becomes more related to share return performance while its association with operating 
performance did not change after the Split Share Structure Reform. In other words, we have evidence 
that state-controlled firms adjusted executive remuneration scheme to appraise managerial 
performance more through share returns after the reform. The observation that executive 
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remuneration increased relationship only with share return but not with operating performance 
strengthens our inference that this effect is attributed to the reform instead of some unidentified 
confounding effects that influence the state-controlled firms.  
[insert Table 4 here] 
 Turning to privately-controlled firms, notice that the coefficient on RET is significantly positive 
but not the coefficient on ROS. This implies that privately-controlled firms’ executive remuneration is 
more associated with share return performance than operating performance prior to the reform. This 
finding is again broadly similar to Firth et al (2006, 2007) despite of difference in sample period we 
analyze. The coefficients on SSSRRET (i.e. –61.71, t-statistics = –1.17) and SSSRROS are both 
statistically insignificant in the privately-controlled firms. An F test suggests that the difference 
between state-controlled and privately-controlled groups on the coefficient of the interaction term 
SSSRRET is statistically significant. This suggests that the reform did not change the association 
between the executive pay of such firms with both share return and operating performance. The 
contrast in result between state-controlled (treatment group) and privately-controlled (control group) 
firms in Table 4 through the coefficient on SSSRRET confirms our prediction in hypothesis H1. Since 
the effect we find is confined to the treatment group and does not exist in the control group mitigates 
the possibility that our results is attributed to some unidentified confounding affect that influence all 
listed firms in Chinese stock market. Our results in Table 4 are robust to controls of firm 
characteristics and corporate governance. 
As shown in Table 1 there is an upward time trend in executive pay level both among state- and 
privately-controlled firms. However, since this pay inflation effect is observed in both groups of firms, 
this reduces the possibility that it is the underlying cause of our finding in Table 4, where we show 
increased pay to performance relationship only for stock returns and only in state-controlled firms. 
There is also possibility that some managers may use the reform as an excuse to increase pay 
regardless of performance. If this effect is systematic, then we should observe in Table 4 that the 
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relationship between pay and performance decline following the reform. However in both state- and 
privately-controlled firms, we observe no statistically significant decline in pay to performance 
relationship after the reform. The only change in this relationship after the reform is an increase 
among state-controlled listed firms, which we rationalize as improved governance following reform 
among such firms. 
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4.3 Test of hypothesis H2 
 Table 5 presents our analyses by splitting the state-controlled firms into those that are not and 
those that are affiliated with SASAC. As mentioned in Section 2.3, we expect the incentives to 
improve share return performance after the reform to be lower among SASAC affiliated firms since 
the state shareholders are expected to maintain central government’s control of listed firms vital to 
national interest. In other words, there is no incentive for controlling shareholders in such firms to 
adjust executive remuneration scheme to pressure or entice managers to boost the market value of 
their firms. Among non-SASAC firms, the coefficient on SSSRRET is significantly positive, i.e. 
107.8345 (t-statistics = 3.96). On the other hand, the same coefficient from the analysis of the SASAC 
firms is statistically insignificant, i.e. –53.2878 (t-statistics = –0.45). In other words, the increase in 
relationship between executive remuneration and share return among state-controlled firms we 
previously observe in Table 4 exist only in firms that are not expected to maintain government 
control, i.e. the non-SASAC firms. In firms where state shareholders have little to gain from the 
reform, i.e. the SASAC, we observe no such effect. Thus, the finding in Table 5 not only confirms our 
prediction in hypothesis H2 but further strengthens the inference that the effect we find (i.e. increased 
relation between executive pay and share return among state-controlled firms) is attributed to the 
Split Share Structure Reform.16 
[insert Table 5 here] 
4.4 Test of hypothesis H3 
 Table 6 presents the findings of our analyses by splitting the state-controlled listed firms into 
those that pay more or less restricted shares to holders of unrestricted shares as consideration 
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package. Panels A and B partition the sample by payout ratio and cost ratio respectively. The payout 
ratio is the number of restricted shares paid out divided by total number of restricted shares, and cost 
ratio is the number of restricted shares paid out divided by the number of restricted shares that 
remains after the payout. We argue that state shareholders that payout more of their restricted shares 
as consideration to holders of unrestricted shares are more committed to enhance market value of the 
firm after the reform. This is because they paid a higher cost to participate in the reform and therefore 
would like to recuperate this cost by having the option to cash in their restricted shares from higher 
share price. In other words, controlling shareholders of such firms have greater incentive to adjust 
executive remuneration schemes to pressure or entice managers to work toward improving firms’ 
share return performance. We confirm this in both Panels A and B that the coefficient on the 
interactive term SSSRRET is significantly positive only in state-controlled firms that payout more 
restricted shares. For instance, in Panel A this coefficient is 96.78 (t-statistics = 2.76) in the higher 
payout ratio group and only 46.31 (t-statistics = 1.20) in the lower payout ratio group. An F test on the 
difference between them is significant at 1% level. In Panel B we get broadly similar results. Our 
findings in Table 6 not only confirms the prediction in hypothesis H3, but also strengthens the 
inference that the increase in relationship between executive remuneration and share return 
performance that we observe in support of hypothesis H1 and H2 are indeed attributed to the Split 
Share Structure Reform. 
[insert Table 6 here] 
5. Conclusion 
 We provide empirical evidence that the executive remuneration is more sensitive to share return 
performance among state-controlled listed firms in China since the Split Share Structure Reform was 
formalized in late 2005. Prior to the reform, the controlling state shareholders held restricted shares 
that were not tradable in the stock exchanges, and so enjoy no wealth benefit from rising share prices. 
This gave the dominant shareholders limited incentives to appraise executives using share returns. 
Following the reform, we argue that the conversion of the restricted shares held by the controlling 
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shareholders of these firms into tradable shares aligned the wealth impact of share price movement 
between the dominant and minority shareholders. This gives the controlling shareholders a greater 
incentive to adjust executive remuneration schemes in ways that entice executives to maximize firm 
value. We confirm this effect empirically by documenting an increased relationship between 
executive remuneration and share return performance after the reform in state-controlled but not 
privately-controlled Chinese listed firms. Among the state-controlled firms, this effect is more 
pronounced among those with higher state ownership and greater consideration payout by restricted 
shares. 
 Our results have two key implications. First, we confirm that the Split Share Structure Reform in 
China created benefits for minority shareholders of Chinese listed firms, since it increased managerial 
accountability for share price movement. This highlights the importance of regulatory intervention, 
especially in transitional economies that have not yet built a strong shareholder protection regime and 
information disclosure environment. This also suggests that ending the split share structure per se is 
effective in strengthening corporate governance among Chinese listed firms, even without further 
ownership reform. Second, using a unique setting of exogenously induced reduction in conflicts of 
interests between dominant and minority shareholders, we show that such reduction could strengthen 
corporate governance and reduce agency costs. This is an important finding, since it illustrates that 
the western PLC corporate form need not be a panacea in transitional economies. An economy that 
resists full privatization and ownership dispersion for socio-political reasons, can still improve 
minority shareholder rights, reduce agency costs, improve corporate governance, and maintain the 
strong monitoring role of a dominant state shareholder, as long as there is a proper alignment of 
interests between the different classes of shareholders. 
 Our findings also open up some interesting research questions for future study.17 For instance, it 
will be interesting to examine whether non-SASAC listed firms are associated with better stock return 
performance following the Split Share Structure Reform. If controlling shareholders of these firms 
improve corporate governance by increasing the link between executive pay with stock return 
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performance, then this should increase the motives of managers in these firms to focus on value 
enhancing projects and avoid value deteriorating decisions. However, unlike their 
privately-controlled counterparts, state-controlled listed firms are also associated with the 
responsibility to forward government socio-political objectives in addition to profitability and stock 
value maximization. The government may not necessarily reward managers who achieve these 
objectives through pay but through non-pecuniary returns such as promotion in the political party. 
This also provides an interesting research question for further study in China.  
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Table 1 
Sample description 
 
  All 
State-controlled  
listed firms 
Privately-controlled 
listed firms 
  ExecPay Obs. ExecPay Obs. ExecPay Obs. 
2000 140 269 141 231 135 38 
2001 292 864 281 739 359 125 
2002 379 993 369 815 424 178 
2003 485 1029 484 787 490 242 
2004 590 1091 594 793 579 298 
2005 610 1161 614 837 599 324 
2006 716 1075 745 754 650 321 
2007 893 1213 950 801 783 412 
       
Average 513   522   502   
       
Sum   7695   5757   1938 
       
Note: This table presents the yearly average executive pay and number of observations of Chinese listed 
firms in our sample. Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. Executive pay is the sum of the total pay of the top 
three executives of the firm (in thousand RMB). 
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our analyses. Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. 
ExecPAY is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives (in thousand RMB). SSSR indicates the period after 
the Split Share Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET 
captures stock market performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance 
and is measured as operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial 
risk and is measured as debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of 
sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 0 
otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by 
the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above cross-sectional median and 0 
otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy 
set to 1 for firms with above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with 
proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms 
`with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms 
from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms in more regulated industry and 
0 otherwise. 
Panel A:       
  Mean Std Dev 25% 50% 75% Obs. 
ExecPay 568 548 213 400 730 7,695 
SSSR 0.2725 0.4453 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 7,695 
RET 0.3487 0.9341 -0.2526 -0.0601 0.6250 7,695 
ROS 0.0100 0.3206 0.0001 0.0345 0.0877 7,695 
Size 20.5122 0.9963 19.9003 20.4605 21.0682 7,695 
Lev 0.4823 0.1821 0.3534 0.4885 0.6137 7,695 
SG 0.2683 0.8815 0.0106 0.1593 0.3435 7,695 
ST 0.0609 0.2393 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 7,695 
OwnCon 0.2156 0.1401 0.1044 0.1803 0.3036 7,695 
BSize 0.3496 0.4769 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 7,695 
BMeet 0.5848 0.4928 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 7,695 
BIndep 0.8364 0.3699 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 7,695 
CeoOwn 0.2595 0.4384 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 7,695 
Duality 0.0096 0.0976 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 7,695 
Area 0.1340 0.3407 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 7,695 
RInd 0.0804 0.2720 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 7,695 
       
 
Panel B 
  SOEs Non-SOEs   
 
SASAC Non-SASAC 
  
 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
ExecPay 824 635 531 517 589 574 
RET 0. 6875 1.1575 0. 2883 0.9469 0. 4854 1.1872 
ROS 0.03549 0.12162 -0.0167 2.8792 -0.7842 25.3014 
 
SASAC Vs Non-SASAC SASAC Vs Non-SOEs Non-SASAC Vs Non-SOEs 
 
Difference t-stat Difference t-stat Difference t-stat 
ExecPay 293 12.63*** 235 8.44*** -58 -4.08*** 
RET 0.3943 9.32*** 0.1972 3.54*** -0.1971 -7.27*** 
ROS 0.0523 0.44 0.8197 0.78 0.7675 2.14** 
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Table 3 
Correlation analyses 
This table presents the correlation analyses of the variables used in our analyses. Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. ExecPAY is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives (in thousand RMB). 
SSSR indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market performance and is measured 
as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is measured as 
debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 
0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above 
cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number of board 
meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms with CEO shareholding level in 
the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms in more regulated industry 
and 0 otherwise. The asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.  
| ExecPay SSSR RET ROS Size Lev SG ST OwnCon BSize BMeet BIndep CeoOwn Duality Area RInd 
ExecPay 1                            
SSSR 0.339* 1                          
RET 0.111* 0.385* 1                        
ROS 0.088* 0.009 0.088* 1                      
Size 0.406* 0.141* 0.051* 0.226* 1                     
Lev –0.040* 0.106* 0.011 –0.409* –0.187* 1                   
SG 0.023 0.023 0.103* 0.102* –0.020 0.024 1                  
ST –0.141* 0.072* 0.020 –0.248* –0.322* 0.478* 0.084* 1                
OwnCon –0.060* –0.213* –0.064* 0.119* 0.237* –0.163* –0.010 –0.121* 1              
BSize 0.043* –0.083* –0.038* 0.018 0.131* –0.002 –0.027* –0.039* 0.017 1            
BMeet 0.072* 0.038* 0.037* –0.022 0.007 0.084* 0.027* 0.053* –0.050* –0.041* 1          
BIndep 0.081* 0.106* 0.106* 0.057* 0.002 –0.024* 0.006 –0.047* –0.004 –0.279* 0.024* 1        
CeoOwn 0.116* 0.007 –0.002 0.048* 0.046* –0.069* –0.035* –0.112* –0.123* –0.037* –0.055* 0.014 1      
Duality 0.001 –0.034* 0.000 –0.023* –0.026* 0.011 0.003 0.025* –0.031* 0.006 0.011 0.030* –0.001 1    
Area 0.171* –0.021 –0.009 0.020 0.070* 0.028* 0.017 0.010 0.000 –0.012 0.056* 0.034* 0.017 0.002 1  
RInd 0.050* 0.008 0.009 0.027* 0.098* 0.028* 0.054* 0.018 0.042* 0.035* –0.078* –0.013 –0.062* 0.006 0.059* 1 
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Table 4 
State-controlled vs privately-controlled listed firms 
This table presents the regression analyses of the relationship between executive remuneration and share 
return performance. Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. The dependent variable is the aggregate total pay of 
the top three executives (in thousand RMB). SSSR indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform 
and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market 
performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as 
operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is 
measured as debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of 
sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 0 
otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership 
held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size above cross-sectional 
median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. 
BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number of board meetings and 0 otherwise. 
BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. 
CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile 
and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. 
RInd is 1 for firms in more regulated industry and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
State-controlled 
listed firms  
Privately-controlled 
listed firms 
SSSR  212.89 (8.08) ***   120.40 (3.11) *** 
RET  –21.01 (–1.02)    85.79 (1.77) * 
SSSRRET  79.04 (3.00) ***   –61.71 (–1.17)  
ROS  32.32 (2.06) **   –26.60 (–1.56)  
SSSRROS  82.62 (1.10)    87.57 (0.96)  
Size  199.24 (21.89) ***   235.55 (12.02) *** 
Lev  253.34 (7.39) ***   215.85 (2.92) *** 
SG  19.43 (2.57) ***   0.87 (0.13)  
ST  –51.74 (–2.23) **   –30.43 (–0.86)  
OwnCon  –346.18 (–7.65) ***   –417.59 (–3.81) *** 
BSize  20.94 (1.53)    43.20 (1.47)  
BMeet  52.87 (4.17) ***   2.34 (0.10)  
BIndep  52.81 (3.47) ***   58.26 (1.84) * 
CeoOwn  82.23 (5.52) ***   81.55 (2.73) *** 
Duality  57.06 (0.60)    66.35 (1.01)  
Area  209.85 (11.23) ***   253.98 (7.46) *** 
RInd  –49.01 (–2.48) ***   –172.38 (–3.34) *** 
Intercept  –3793.25 (–20.39) ***   –4359.95 (–10.89) *** 
 
 
       
Adjusted R2   0.28       0.21    
Obs.   5757      1938    
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Table 5 
Non-SASAC vs SASAC state-controlled firms 
This table presents the regression analyses of the relationship between executive remuneration and share return 
performance. Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. State-controlled listed firms are partitioned into those that are and are 
not controlled by State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The dependent variable is 
the aggregate total pay of the top three executives (in thousand RMB). SSSR indicates the period after the Split Share 
Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market 
performance and is measured as annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as operating 
income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is measured as debt to equity 
ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of 
special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration 
measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for 
firms with board size above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board 
chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number of board meetings and 0 
otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. 
CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms with CEO shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 
otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms in 
more regulated industry and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and ***, **, and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 Non-SASAC SASAC 
SSSR 193.5934 (6.87) 
*** 233.5495 (3.05) *** 
RET –37.1272 (–1.85) 
* 63.29737 (0.56)  
SSSRRET 107.8345 (3.96) 
*** –53.2878 (–0.45)  
ROS 34.0054 (2.25) 
** 476.1035 (2.45) ** 
SSSRROS 63.0088 (0.85) 
 205.3861 (0.46)  
Size 186.0810 (19.63) 
*** 217.8896 (7.59) *** 
Lev 234.7064 (6.52) 
*** 307.4459 (2.62) *** 
SG 20.7158 (2.70) 
*** –19.6976 (–0.72)  
ST –51.5569 (–2.19) 
** –187.3 (–2.03) ** 
OwnCon –423.3271 (–9.62) 
*** 271.9025 (1.29)  
BSize 30.8023 (2.18) 
** –49.0703 (–1.00)  
BMeet 42.9416 (3.31) 
*** 144.9887 (3.19) *** 
BIndep 56.3815 (3.60) 
*** 20.00802 (0.34)  
CeoOwn 71.1564 (4.71) 
*** 235.6668 (3.99) *** 
Duality 59.9501 (0.61) 
 236.6501 (0.66)  
Area 191.3483 (10.88) 
*** 296.1646 (3.83) *** 
RInd –52.6476 (–2.59) 
*** –20.2298 (–0.31)  
Intercept –3507.9860 (–18.06) 
*** –4241.14 (–7.49) *** 
   
 
  
 
Adjusted R2 0.2608  
 0.3382   
Obs. 5172   585   
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Table 6 
State-controlled firms partitioned by level of consideration payout through restricted shares 
This table presents the regression analyses of the relationship between executive remuneration and share return performance. Our sample period is 2000 to 2007. State-controlled listed firms are 
partitioned by the level of consideration payout. Payout ratio (Panel A) is number of restricted shares paid out divided by total number of restricted shares. Cost ratio (Panel B) is number of 
restricted shares paid out divided by the number of restricted shares that are not paid out. The dependent variable is the aggregate total pay of the top three executives (in thousand RMB). SSSR 
indicates the period after the Split Share Structure Reform and is a dummy variable assigned 1 for years 2006 onward and 0 otherwise. RET captures stock market performance and is measured as 
annual stock return. ROS captures operating performance and is measured as operating income divided by sales. Size is log of total assets of the firm. Lev captures financial risk and is measured as 
debt to equity ratio. SG captures growth opportunity and is the annual percentage growth of sales. ST is 1 for firms on the verge of special treatment, i.e. those with two consecutive years of losses, 
and 0 otherwise. OwnCon is ownership concentration measured by the Herfindahl index based on the ownership held by the 10 largest shareholders of the firm. BSIZE is 1 for firms with board size 
above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Duality is 1 for firms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BMeeting is a dummy set to 1 for firms with above median number 
of board meetings and 0 otherwise. BIndep is 1 for firms with proportion of independent directors above cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. CeoOwn is set to 1 for firms with CEO 
shareholding level in the cross-sectional top or bottom 25 percentile and 0 otherwise. Area is 1 for firms from from developed region (Shanghai or Shenzhen) and 0 otherwise. RInd is 1 for firms 
in more regulated industry and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Payout ratio Panel B: Cost ratio  
 >= Median  <Median   >=Median  <Median  
SSSR 220.8796 (6.10) ***   184.4476 (4.88) *** SSSR 220.4376 (6.09) ***   186.3841 (4.93) *** 
RET –37.748 (–1.41)    12.20001 (0.40)  RET –36.7738 (–1.37)    9.634598 (0.32)  
SSSRRET 96.78913 (2.76) ***   46.31017 (1.20)  SSSRRET 96.17583 (2.74) ***   48.60198 (1.26)  
ROS 22.49648 (1.09)    41.10618 (1.88) * ROS 22.80981 (1.10)    41.59651 (1.90) * 
SSSRROS 138.949 (1.42)    –60.7804 (–0.46)  SSSRROS 137.3663 (1.41)    –58.066 (–0.44)  
Size 200.8071 (17.49) ***   205.1034 (13.15) *** Size 202.7073 (17.61) ***   200.7222 (12.93) *** 
Lev 242.0455 (5.31) ***   272.6408 (5.21) *** Lev 251.0333 (5.50) ***   259.8731 (4.96) *** 
SG 22.16757 (2.06) **   14.72227 (1.57)  SG 21.95288 (2.04) **   15.24589 (1.62)  
ST –71.3297 (–2.36) **   –17.2655 (–0.48)  ST –71.435 (–2.36) **   –18.1392 (–0.50)  
OwnCon –291.57 (–4.43) ***   –525.55 (–7.25) *** OwnCon –295.279 (–4.47) ***   –511.705 (–7.09) *** 
BSize 31.78853 (1.73) *   –0.29258 (–0.01)  BSize 29.75269 (1.62)    2.750624 (0.14)  
BMeet 67.33143 (4.01) ***   30.81015 (1.60)  BMeet 67.50802 (4.02) ***   29.72531 (1.55)  
BIndep 64.63352 (3.09) ***   33.96184 (1.61)  BIndep 64.22511 (3.07) ***   34.53204 (1.63)  
CeoOwn 87.38074 (4.63) ***   85.02638 (3.49) *** CeoOwn 86.01606 (4.56) ***   87.47029 (3.58) *** 
Duality 88.04908 (0.60)    –4.85895 (–0.08)  Duality 86.53757 (0.59)    –3.03465 (–0.05)  
Area 218.605 (9.00) ***   197.6106 (6.94) *** Area 217.1323 (8.94) ***   200.0045 (7.04) *** 
RInd –36.4378 (–1.25)    –67.2507 (–2.52) ** RInd –37.5687 (–1.28)    –63.629 (–2.38) ** 
Intercept –3871.16 (–16.37) ***   –3805.75 (–12.29) *** Intercept –3911.45 (–16.5) ***   –3718.23 (–12.05) *** 
Adjusted 
R2 0.2655       0.2975   
Adjusted 
R2 0.2669       0.2939   
Obs. 3560       2197   Obs. 3556       2201   
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1 There are two types of restricted shares in China: state shares and legal person shares. The state shares can be held by central and 
local government either through bureaucratic agencies or affiliated State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The legal person shares can 
be held by any of the above or private institutions. 
2 There are many anecdotal evidences from the media suggesting that previously restricted shares held by state shareholders have 
been sold in the stock market following this reform.  
 “29 firms this year experienced local government stock ownership reduction” 
http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/zqyw/20110827/4474686.shtml  
 “Selling shares – July wave of government stock ownership reduction wave” 
http://stock.hexun.com/2011-07-29/131890710.html 
 “Local government July stock ownership reduction in 25 listed firms to cash in 3.3billion RMB” 
               http://www.beelink.com/20110808/2808514.shtml 
3
 Between 2005 and 2007, Chinese listed firms are chosen in batches to carry out the reform. Those that are selected must first 
negotiate with existing freely tradable shareholders to agree a compensation scheme (see Firth et al., 2010). Following the 
ratification of the scheme, the restricted shares offered as part of the consideration payout become immediately tradable while the 
rest of the restricted shares are still not tradable for another 12 months. After this period, all restricted shareholders can freely trade 
their shares apart from those large shareholders who possess 5% or more of a listed firm’s shares. Such shareholders are not 
allowed to trade more than 5% and 10% of their restricted shares within the next 12 and 24 months respectively. After 36 months 
following the ratification of the compensation, the reform process completes and all restricted shares of the firm become fully 
tradable. Section 2.2 provides further discussion. 
4 Cheung et al (2010) show positive relationship between corporate governance and the market valuation of Chinese listed firms, 
and this relationship is mainly driven by issues associated with shareholder rights. Thus, our finding that minority shareholders of 
Chinese state-controlled listed firms benefit from the Split Share Structure Reform implies that this reform could contribute to the 
market valuation of such firms.  
5
 For instance, Chen et al. (2006) show that the SASAC based state-controlled firms are associated with significantly lower 
post-listing stock return performance than other state-controlled firms. 
6
 He et al. (2009) found no empirical evidence suggesting that the mandatory adoption of IFRS improved the earnings quality of 
Chinese firms. Their result mitigates the possibility that the evidence we find in support of our hypotheses is attributed to the IFRS 
mandatory adoption instead of the Split Share Structure Reform 
7
 We than the referee for this suggestion. 
8
 This policy has been announced in the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Outline for 
the Long-Range Objective Through the Year 2010 (see http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/134999/135000/8104918.html, in Chinese) 
9 For an example, see http://www.chinasecurities.com.cn/xwzx/11/200804/t20080430_1445678.htm (in Chinese). 
10 Although the GTA/CSMAR database also provides details on CEO pay only, the data coverage on this variable is limited, 
therefore its use will substantially reduce our ability to generalize our findings to the cross-section of listed firms in the Chinese 
stock market. 
11 We also replicated our analyses using logarithm value of executive pay and these additional analyses yield similar inference to 
our main findings. We also replicated the regression in Equation 1 using lagged independent variables and obtained qualitatively 
similar results. However, for brevity we do not tabulate these findings. 
12
 Based on Core and Guay (1999) coefficient α3 can also be interpreted as pay-to-performance sensitivity. There is debate in the 
literature on the proper definition of incentives, i.e., whether pay-performance sensitivity should be measured as change in 
executive wealth for a firm’s percent or “dollar” return performance. The latter specification assumes that the executive marginal 
product of effort is constant across firm size, which is a valid assumption only when considering actions that do not scale with firm 
size, e.g., the purchase of a corporate jet (Baker and Hall, 2004; p. 769). Our specification, instead assumes that the marginal 
product scales proportionally with firm size, which is valid when considering executive actions that affect the overall value of the 
firm. We also add independently a proxy of firm size to control for its effect.   
13
 If bull market in our sample period drives our findings on increased pay to performance association post-reform, then we should 
observe this impact on both state controlled and privately controlled listed firms alike. The fact that we observe greater change in 
this association among state controlled firms, which are more sensitive to the reform than privately controlled firms, is consistent 
with our hypothesis and strengthens our inference that it is due at least partly (but also significantly) to the reform. It is important to 
note that we are not doing a time-series analyses that uses some index portfolio to observe temporal changes. Our research design 
accounts for cross-sectional variations in firm’s sensitivity to the reform. We argue that the state controlled firms are more 
sensitive to the reform than private controlled firms. The empirical evidence we find is consistent with this prediction. Any 
systematic market wide impact, such as bear/bull markets, on the relations we investigate in this paper will only bias against us 
finding evidence consistent with our hypotheses, and will not bias in favour of our results. 
14
 Incentive pay such as stock options was not introduced in China until 2007 onward. Since there is no data prior to the Split Share 
Structure Reform, it is not possible for us to evaluate the impact of this reform on this form of executive pay. The introduction of 
executive stock options is likely to influence managerial incentives for both state-controlled and privately-controlled listed firms. 
Therefore, this introduction is only likely to bias us against finding evidence in support of our hypotheses. 
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15
 We acknowledge the importance of commenting in the paper about the economic significance of our results. As we already 
indicate in the manuscript the association between pay and performance in state-controlled firms is both statistically and 
economically insignificant. However, the effect of the reform on the relation is statistically significant. From a shareholder 
perspective, any non-zero association is preferable to a zero one. Thus, we argue shareholders are better off. Please note that our 
modelling approach allows for non-monotonic relations (post-reform), so it is difficult to interpret the coefficients of interest as 
marginal effects.  
16
 Using the full sample, we also carried out further regression analyses that include a SASAC dummy variable (equivalent to 1 for 
firms controlled by SASAC and 0 otherwise) as well as the interaction term of this dummy variable with SSSR×RET and 
SSSR×ROS in Equation 1 along with all independent variables. These results confirm that the improvement in the association 
between executive pay and stock return performance following the reform is less pronounced among the SASAC group. For 
brevity we do not tabulate these findings. 
17
 We thank the two reviewers for suggesting these future research questions that can be conducted on the basis of the findings 
from our study. 
